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Abstract: The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, baking an 
apple pie entails baking a pie. Now, suppose that both of these options—baking a pie and baking an 
apple pie—are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. 
Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake an apple pie? Or is baking an apple pie 
permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally fundamental, as they would be if 
they were both permissible because, say, they both accord with Kant’s categorical imperative? I defend 
the view that the permissibility of an option that entails another is more fundamental than the 
permissibility of the option that it entails. That is, I defend maximalism: the view that if an agent is 
permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking a pie), this is in virtue of the fact that she is 
permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking an apple pie), where φ-ing is an instance 
of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. If maximalism is correct, then, as I show, 
most theories of morality and rationality must be revised.  
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The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. That is, the 
performance of the one can logically necessitate the performance of the other. For instance, I 
have both the option of typing and the option of typing the word ‘the’, and my typing the 
word ‘the’ entails my typing, for it is logically impossible for me to type the word ‘the’ 
without typing. Such instances of performance entailment are ubiquitous. Kissing 
passionately entails kissing. Walking while chewing gum entails walking. Driving under 55 
mph entails driving under 100 mph. Marrying an unmarried man entails marrying a 
bachelor. Stretching a t1 and then going for a run at t2 entails going for a run at t2. 
 Given that our options include both those that entail others and those that are 
entailed by others, it seems that our practical normative theories (e.g., our theories of 
morality and rationality) need to be able to assess both types. For instance, if I have the 
options of (Opt1) baking, (Opt2) baking a pie, (Opt3) baking an apple pie, and (Opt4) baking 
an apple pie and then taking it to the family who just moved in across the street, it won’t do 
for our normative theory to tell us only whether some proper subset of these are 
permissible. If these are all equally options, then a normative theory concerning the 
permissibility of an agent’s options owes us an account of the permissibility of each and 
every one.  
  
 Now, suppose that our normative theory tells us that all of Opt1–Opt4 are 
permissible. This raises the following important question: What is the relationship between 
the permissibility of an option that entails another (e.g., Opt3) and the permissibility of the 
option that it entails (e.g., Opt2)? More specifically, which, if either, is more fundamental: 
the permissibility of the option that entails the other or the permissibility of the option that it 
entails? Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake an apple pie? Or is 
baking an apple pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally 
fundamental, as they would be if they were both permissible because, say, they both accord 
with Kant’s categorical imperative? Of course, it could be that sometimes the option that 
entails is more fundamental, but other times the option that is entailed is more fundamental. 
There are, then, exactly four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities: (Poss1) 
the permissibility of an option that entails another is always more fundamental than the 
permissibility of the option that it entails; (Poss2) the permissibility of an option that entails 
another is always less fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails; 
(Poss3) the permissibility of an option that entails another and the permissibility of the 
option that it entails are always equally fundamental—that is, the one is never either more or 
less fundamental than the other; and (Poss4) there is a lack uniformity, as there would be, for 
instance, if sometimes the permissibility of an option that entails another is more 
fundamental, but other times it is less fundamental.  
 The point of this paper is to defend Poss1. I’ll defend it against some typical 
objections. And I’ll argue that Poss1 is more plausible than its three alternatives. I’ll proceed 
by considering each of the four possibilities in turn, discussing their relative merits and 
demerits as we go.   
 
1. Maximalism 
The first possibility, Poss1, holds that the permissibility of an option that entails another is 
always more fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails. This view is 
sometimes called maximalism.1 On this view, we must distinguish between maximal and 
                                                            
1 See, for instance, Bykvist 2002 and Gustafsson 2014. Note, however, that my use of the term is broader than theirs. Whereas 
they use the term to refer only to consequentialist theories that take the moral permissibility of maximal options to be more 
fundamental than that of non-maximal options, I use the term to refer to any theory that takes the (moral or rational) 
permissibility of maximal options to be more fundamental than that of non-maximal options.   
  
non-maximal options. An option φ is a maximal option if and only if there is no option ψ such 
that ψ-ing entails φ-ing but not vice versa. Otherwise, it’s a non-maximal option. So walking at 
t1 won’t be a maximal option if walking fast at t1 is an option. And walking fast at t1 won’t be 
a maximal option if walking fast at t1 and then jogging at t2 is an option. And so on and so 
forth until we get to an option for which there is no other option that entails it.  
We must distinguish between these two types of options, because, on maximalism, 
they are to be assessed differently. For, when fully spelled out, the view says the following. 
 
Maximalism: (Max1) For any non-maximal option 𝜈, S’s 𝜈-ing is permissible if and 
only if there exists an option φ such that S’s φ-ing is permissible and S’s φ-ing entails 
S’s 𝜈-ing but not vice versa, and when S’s 𝜈-ing is permissible, this is in virtue of the 
fact that there exists an option φ such that S’s φ-ing is permissible and S’s φ-ing 
entails S’s 𝜈-ing but not vice versa. And, (Max2) for any maximal option 𝜇, S’s 𝜇-ing 
is permissible if and only if S’s 𝜇-ing has feature F, and when S’s 𝜇-ing is permissible, 
this is in virtue of the fact that S’s 𝜇-ing has feature F.2  
 
Maximalism is neutral on what sorts of things count as options. Perhaps, it is only 
voluntary acts. But, perhaps, the non-voluntary formations of beliefs and other attitudes also 
count as options. And maximalism allows for options to be conjunctive. An agent could, for 
instance, have the option of asserting that p while believing that p is false. What’s more, 
maximalism is neutral on what ‘F’ stands for. Indeed, we can substitute for ‘has feature F’ 
anything that would render Max2 coherent, including ‘maximizes utility’, ‘accords with 
Kant’s categorical imperative’, or ‘contains only beliefs for which S has sufficient evidence 
and contains all and only those acts that maximize expected utility’. As this last example 
illustrates, F can be something quite complicated, involving the assessment of different 
types of options according to different criteria—e.g., evaluating beliefs in terms of evidence 
and acts in terms of expected utility. 
                                                            
2 There are two types of maximalism: moral maximalism and rational maximalism. To get moral maximalism, insert the 
word ‘morally’ before each instance of ‘permissible’ in the above formulation. To get rational maximalism, insert the word 
‘rationally’ instead. In this paper, I will be concerned with both moral maximalism and rational maximalism and so will 
typically leave the kind of permissibility (moral or rational) unspecified. To facilitate this, I will discuss only examples in which 
the agent’s moral permissions coincide with her rational permissions.  
  
The thought underlying maximalism is that if I’m permitted to perform a certain 
type of action (say, baking), then there must be some instance of this type that I’m permitted 
to perform (say, baking a pie). For if I’m not permitted to bake anything (not a pie, not a 
cake, not cookies, not anything), then I’m not permitted to bake. Moreover, if I’m not 
permitted to bake a pie and then eat either some or none of it (and assume that, if I bake a 
pie, I must then eat either some or none of it), then I’m not permitted to bake a pie. Suppose, 
for instance, that an evil demon will kill me and everyone I love if either I bake a pie and 
then eat some of it or bake a pie and then eat none of it. In that case, it would be 
impermissible for me to bake a pie. And this is because there is no instance of baking a pie 
that I’m permitted to perform. Note, then, that, as I’m understanding things, S’s φ-ing 
counts an instance of S’s ψ-ing if and only if S’s φ-ing entails S’s ψ-ing but not vice a versa. 
Thus, both baking-a-pie-and-then-eating-some-of-it and baking-a-pie-and-then-eating-none-
of-it count as instances of baking a pie.  
So, on maximalism, if I’m permitted to bake, this is because I’m permitted to perform 
some instance of baking, such as baking a pie. And if I’m permitted to bake a pie, this is 
because I’m permitted to perform some instance of pie-baking, such as baking an apple pie. 
And if I’m permitted to bake an apple pie, this is because I’m permitted to perform some 
instance of apple-pie-baking, such as baking an apple pie and then taking it to the family 
who just moved in across the street. And so on and so forth. But, of course, if this just goes 
on forever, we’ll end up with an infinite regress. I believe, however, that this will not go on 
forever. We will eventually arrive at an option that is not entailed by any other option.  
Some may question this belief. The worry would be that, for any option (e.g., the 
option of punching), there will always be a more specific option that entails it (e.g., the 
option of punching a speed bag) and an even more specific option that entails that option 
(e.g., the option of punching a speed bag softly), and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. It may 
seem, then, that we will never arrive at an option that is so specific that there is no other 
more specific option that entails it.  
But although there is no limit to the degree of specificity with which we can describe 
a particular action, there is a limit to an agent’s ability to determine the specificity of her 
actions. Consider that although I can determine whether I punch a speed bag with my right 
or left fist and also whether I punch it softly or forcefully, I can’t, it seems, determine 
  
whether I punch it with precisely 113.1052 newtons of force. And, importantly, I must be 
able to control whether I φ if my φ-ing is to count as an option for me and, thus, as 
something that I can be obligated to perform and be accountable for failing to perform. But, 
in the relevant sense, I do not control whether I punch the bag with precisely 113.1052 
newtons of force, and so this does not count as an option for me. And this explains both why 
I cannot be obligated to do so and why I can’t be held accountable should I fail to do so. So 
even though I have the option of punching the bag softly and my punching the bag with 
113.1052 newtons of force entails punching the bag softly, I don’t have the option of 
punching it with precisely 113.1052 newtons of force. For the control that I exert over the 
specificity of my actions is limited. Consequently, the specificity of my options is limited. 
Thus, it is not the case that, for any option that I have, I must have some other more specific 
option that entails it. Although there will always be a more specific event that entails it, that 
more specific event will not always be an option for me. And this along with the fact that 
our existences are finite suggests that we will always eventually arrive at a maximal option.    
When we do arrive at a maximal option, we won’t be able to derive its permissibility 
from that of some other permissible option that entails it. Given that it’s a maximal option, 
there will be no other (distinct) option that entails it. Thus, maximalism must include not 
only Max1 but also Max2. Max2 tells us that a maximal option is permissible if and only if it 
has feature F. Moreover, Max2 tells us that when a maximal option is permissible, this is in 
virtue of the fact that it has feature F. But what’s distinctive and interesting about 
maximalism is that it tells us that we don’t evaluate non-maximal options in the same way. 
Instead of evaluating non-maximal options in terms of whether or not they have feature F, 
we evaluate them in terms of whether there is some other permissible option that entails it. 
Thus, Max1 tells us that a non-maximal option is permissible if and only if there is some 
permissible option that entails it but not vice versa. Moreover, it says that when a non-
maximal option is permissible, this is in virtue of the fact that there is some permissible 
option that entails it but not vice versa. The need for this italicized phrase can be seen when 
we consider pairs of options that each entail the other, such as marrying a bachelor and 
marrying an unmarried man. It can’t be that the one is permissible in virtue of being 
entailed by the other. For to say that an option is permissible in virtue of being entailed by 
itself (or its logical equivalent) is to offer no explanation at all. What explains the 
  
permissibility of marrying an unmarried man, then, is not that it is permissible to marry a 
bachelor, but that it is permissible to marry some specific bachelor (i.e., some specific 
unmarried man).  
So, at this point, the reader should have a basic understanding of maximalism. This 
understanding will be deepened as we consider its implications and compare it to its 
competitors. But before we look to some of maximalism’s competitors, it will be good to 
consider some of the standard objections to maximalism and why I think they fail. 
 
2. Objections to Maximalism 
Perhaps, the most significant of these is the objection that maximalism has counterintuitive 
implications in cases that seem to have the following three features: (2.1) S has the options of 
φ-ing well, φ-ing poorly, and not φ-ing at all. (2.2) It would be okay if S doesn’t φ at all, but 
it would be better (indeed, best) if she were to φ well. And worst of all would be if she were 
to φ poorly. Thus, she ought to φ well. (2.3) As a matter of fact, if S were to φ, she would φ 
poorly.  
To illustrate, consider the now famous case of Professor Procrastinate:   
 
Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. He is the best person to do the 
review, has the time, and so on. The best thing that can happen is that he says yes, and then 
writes the review when the book arrives. However, suppose it is further the case that were 
Procrastinate to say yes, he would not in fact get around to writing the review. Not because of 
incapacity or outside interference or anything like that, but because he would keep on putting 
the task off. …Moreover, we may suppose, [his saying yes and never writing the review] is the 
worst that can happen. It would lead to the book not being reviewed at all. (Jackson & 
Pargetter 1986, 235) 
 
In this case, S is Professor Procrastinate, φ-ing is accepting the invitation, φ-ing well is 
accepting and then writing, and φ-ing poorly is accepting and then never writing. 
Employing this sort of case, critics offer the following argument against 
maximalism:3 
                                                            
3 See, for instance, Cariani 2013, Jackson & Pargetter 1986, and Snedegar 2014. Admittedly, they don’t use this sort of 
argument directly against maximalism. Instead, they use it against views like possibilism (i.e., the view that whether one ought 
to φ depends on whether the best possible thing that one can do entails φ-ing) and inheritance (i.e., the view that if φ-ing 
  
 
(2.4)  Maximalism is true, and, thus, S’s φ-ing is permissible if and only if it is 
entailed by some permissible option. [Assumption for reductio] 
(2.5)  S has the option of φ-ing well. [Assumption] 
(2.6) If φ-ing well is an option, it is S’s best option. And, thus, if φ-ing well is an 
option, it’s a permissible option (indeed, it is what S ought to do). [From the 
stipulations of the case] 
(2.7)  φ-ing well entails φ-ing. [Analytic] 
(2.8)  Thus, S’s φ-ing is permissible. [From 2.4–2.7] 
(2.9)  S’s φ-ing is not permissible. [Intuition] 
(2.10)  Therefore, it is not the case that maximalism is true. [From 2.4, 2.8, & 2.9] 
 
Such critics find 2.9 intuitively obvious. They claim that Professor Procrastinate is not 
permitted to accept given that he would not write if he were to accept.  
Now, not everyone finds 2.9 intuitively compelling, but nevertheless that’s the 
argument against maximalism that many critics give. I suspect that disagreement about 2.9 
stems from the fact that such cases (e.g., Professor Procrastinate) are under-describe. And, 
once we take note of the two ways in which the missing details might be spelled out, we see 
that we should reject either 2.5 or 2.9. Here’s my argument for this.  
 
(2.11)  S is either irrepressible or repressible—that is, either (a) S will φ poorly 
regardless of how he now responds to his reasons or (b) it is not the case that 
S will φ poorly regardless of how he now responds to his reasons. [From the 
law of excluded middle] 
(2.12)  If S is irrepressible, then we should reject 2.5, which says that S has the option 
of φ-ing well. For if S will φ poorly regardless how he now responds to his 
reasons, then he doesn’t, at present, have the power to direct the course of his 
future actions such that he will φ well. And, thus, he doesn’t, at present, have 
the option of φ-ing well. [Intuition] 
                                                            
entails ψ-ing, then ‘S ought to φ’ entails ‘S ought to ψ’). But, given the relevant similarities between these views and 
maximalism, the argument can be turned into one against maximalism, as I’ve done above.  
  
(2.13)  If S is repressible, then we should reject 2.9, which says that S’s φ-ing is not 
permissible. For, if he is repressible, then he should direct the course of his 
future actions by responding appropriately, at present, to his reasons, thereby 
ensuring that he will φ and φ well. And, thus, he’s not just permitted to φ; 
he’s obligated to φ. [Intuition] 
(2.14)  Therefore, we should reject either 2.5 or 2.9. [From 2.11–2.13] 
 
 To illustrate, consider Professor Procrastinate. Given Jackson and Pargetter’s 
description of the case, it’s unclear whether Professor Procrastinate is repressible or 
irrepressible. For all that they say, it could be that Procrastinate is aware of his tendency to 
procrastinate and that, when it’s really important to him that he doesn’t procrastinate, he 
resolves now not to give into the temptation to procrastinate later on. And it may even be, as 
we’ll indeed suppose, that his making this resolution is sufficient to ensure that he won’t 
procrastinate. And, in that case, he is repressible, for he will write the review if he responds 
appropriately to his reasons by resolving now to write the review as soon as the book 
arrives. So, one possibility for why he wouldn’t write if he were to accept is that he’s not 
now responding appropriately to his reasons. And, in that case, my clear intuition is that 
Professor Procrastinate is not only permitted to accept, but is obligated to accept. For he’s 
obligated to respond appropriately to his reasons, accepting the invitation while also 
resolving to write the review as soon as the book arrives. In which case, he will accept and 
write the review. And so it seems that we should reject 2.9 if he is repressible.4 
Of course, he could instead be irrepressible such that no matter how he responds 
now to his reasons, and, thus, no matter what he resolves now to do later on, his later self is 
going to choose to procrastinate when the book arrives. In that case, I think that he just has 
to accept that he is irrepressible, having no more control at present over whether his future 
                                                            
4 Another possibility is that he has made the following prior arrangement with a colleague: If he copies his colleague on an 
email in which he accepts an invitation to do something, he thereby bets this colleague ten thousand dollars that he will do that 
something. Further suppose that, given this, Professor Procrastinate would write the review if he were to copy his colleague on 
the email in which he accepts the journal’s invitation to write the book review. And this is compatible with Jackson and 
Pargetter’s description of the case, for it may be that Professor Procrastinate doesn’t want to make this bet and so wouldn’t 
copy his colleague on the email if he were to accept. And, in that case, it could still be that, were Professor Procrastinate to 
accept, he would not write the review. But, in such a case, I do not have the intuition that Professor Procrastinate should not 
accept the invitation (that is, I do not find 2.9 plausible). Rather, I have the intuition that Professor Procrastinate should accept 
by email while copying his colleague on that email and should, therefore, accept.    
  
self will write the review than I have over whether the next U.S. Congress will amend the 
constitution so as to prohibit the private ownership of firearms. And, if that’s how we’re 
supposed to imagine things, then although we should readily accept that Professor 
Procrastinate is not permitted to accept (and, so, accept 2.9), we should deny that he has, at 
present, the option of accepting and writing. For if he doesn’t, at present, have the power to 
direct the course of his future actions so as to ensure that he will write the review when the 
book arrives, in what sense does he have, at present, the option of writing when the book 
arrives? To have the option of φ-ing is to have control over whether one φs. But, if Professor 
Procrastinate is irrepressible, he has, at present, no control over whether he will write when 
the book arrives. And so I think that we should deny 2.5 if Procrastinate is irrepressible.  
 So I don’t think that cases like Professor Procrastinate pose a real worry for 
maximalism.5 But another worry concerning maximalism is that it gives rise to Ross’s 
paradox (1941). To illustrate, imagine that I have promised to mail an important letter for 
you and so am obligated to do so. Now, mailing the letter entails either mailing or burning 
it. So maximalism implies that I’m obligated to either mail or burn the letter. Or, at least, it 
does if we plausibly assume that I’m obligated to perform an option if and only if it is my 
only permissible option. For, in that case, we can derive from maximalism: S is obligated to 
perform a non-maximal option if and only if every permissible maximal option entails S’s 
performing that non-maximal option. And every permissible maximal option entails my 
mailing the letter, which in turn entails my either mailing or burning the letter. Thus, on 
maximalism, I’m obligated to either mail or burn the letter. Now, some claim that this is 
false. But they are, I believe, mistaken. Admittedly, it can, in certain contexts, sound 
infelicitous to claim that I’m obligated to either mail or burn the letter. But we can easily 
explain this without supposing that the reason for its sounding infelicitous is that it is false. 
The explanation for its sounding infelicitous is rather that it violates Grice’s maxim of 
quantity, which holds that claiming that I’m obligated to either mail or burn the letter when 
we know that I’m obligated to mail the letter is inappropriately uninformative.6  
                                                            
5 There are other objections to maximalism concerning its implication in cases (see Bykvist 2002 and Gustafsson 2014), but, 
as I argue elsewhere (2015a), they too rely on an implausible view of what it is to have an option now of dong something later 
on—one according to which I needn’t have the present opportunity and ability to influence what I do later on to have now the 
option of doing that something later on. 
6 See, for instance, Castañeda 1981 and Wedgwood 2006. But see Cariani 2013 for a criticism of this response to Ross’s 
paradox. Unfortunately, I don’t have space here to address Cariani’s criticism. 
  
The only other reason that I can see for thinking that “I have an obligation to either 
mail or burn the letter” must be false (other than it sounds infelicitous) is that when this 
claim is combined with certain other assumptions, it implies that I have a reason to burn the 
letter, which is clearly false. For the claim “I have an obligation to either mail or burn the 
letter” implies that I have a reason to burn the letter if we assume both that (A1) I can fulfill 
my obligation to either mail or burn the letter by burning the letter and that (A2) if my φ-ing 
would fulfill an obligation, then that fact itself provides me with a reason to φ. Of course, 
this means that the extent to which Ross’s paradox should trouble us is in strict proportion 
to how compelled we should feel to endorse both A1 and A2. And I don’t feel compelled to 
endorse either, let alone both. I’m happy to say that the only way to fulfill an obligation to 
perform either φ or ψ in cases where only one of these two is permissible is to perform the 
permissible one. And I’m also happy to say that the mere fact that my φ-ing would fulfill an 
obligation is not itself a reason for me to φ—that the only reasons for me to φ are those that 
account for my being obligated to φ, not the mere fact that my φ-ing is obligatory. So I don’t 
think that we should reject maximalism on account of its giving rise to Ross’s “paradox.” 
 Another worry about maximalism is that it entails that we must reject either the 
validity or the first premise of the following argument, where Repressible Procrastinate is 
one who would write the review if he were now to respond appropriately to his reasons, 
accepting the invitation while resolving to get to work on the review as soon as the book 
arrives. 
 
(2.15)  Repressible Procrastinate is obligated to decline the invitation if he’s going to 
procrastinate indefinitely. [Intuition] 
(2.16)  Repressible Procrastinate is going to procrastinate indefinitely. [From the 
stipulations of the case] 
(2.17)  Therefore, Repressible Procrastinate is obligated to decline the invitation. 
(From 2.15 & 2.16) 
 
Maximalism implies that Repressible Procrastinate is permitted (indeed, obligated) to accept 
the invitation, which contradicts 2.17. So the maximalist must either deny 2.15 or reject the 
inference from 2.15 and 2.16 to 2.17. Denying 2.16 is not an option, because 2.16 just follows 
  
from the stipulations of the case, which include the stipulation that even if he were to accept 
the invitation, he would not in fact ever get around to writing the review. Thus, it follows 
from the stipulations of the case that he is not going to respond appropriately to his reasons 
and, so, is not going to resolve now to write the review as soon as the book arrives.  
 Now, it’s difficult to deny 2.15, as it seems quite plausible. But I don’t think that the 
maximalist needs to deny 2.15, for she can plausibly deny the validity of the argument. That 
the argument is invalid can be seen by considering the following structurally identical 
argument. 
 
(2.18)  Olga is obligated to kill Yaakov gently if she’s going to kill him. (Intuition) 
(2.19)  Olga is going to kill Yaakov. (Stipulation) 
(2.20)  Therefore, Olga is obligated to kill Yaakov gently. (From 2.18 & 2.19) 
 
There are clearly possible worlds in which both 2.18 and 2.19 are true but 2.20 is 
false, such as the one in which the following are all true: (2.21) Olga is an unfailing hired 
assassin who’s been contracted to kill Yaakov, (2.22) it would be better for Olga to kill him 
gently as opposed to non-gently, but (2.23) Olga ought not to kill Yaakov, gently or 
otherwise. Thus, we should think that neither the inference from 2.18 and 2.19 to 2.20 nor the 
inference from 2.15 and 2.16 to 2.17 is an instance of modus ponens or any other valid 
argument form. We should, then, deny that the conditional expressed by 2.15 is a material 
conditional with “Repressible Procrastinate is obligated to decline the invitation” as its 
consequent and “he’s going to procrastinate indefinitely” as its antecedent. Instead, we 
should, perhaps, think that the obligation specified in 2.15 takes wide scope over the entire 
conditional such that it is saying that Repressible Procrastinate is obligated either to refrain 
from procrastinating indefinitely or to decline the invitation (Broome 2004). Of course, this is 
just one possibility on how to interpret the conditional expressed by 2.15.7 The maximalist 
needn’t say which possibility is correct, but only that the correct one is such that the 
inference from 2.15 and 2.16 to 2.17 is invalid. And saying this seems all too plausible. 
 So far, we’ve seen no good reason to reject maximalism. There could be other 
objections that I haven’t yet canvassed, but, even so, I’ll turn now to make my case against 
                                                            
7 Another possibility is that deontic conditionals are a special, primitive type of conditional (see, e.g., von Wright 1956). 
  
maximalism’s alternatives. My intent is to make sufficiently strong cases against each of 
maximalism’s alternatives that we’ll be more confident that maximalism is true than that 
one of its alternatives is true.  
 
3. Minimalism 
This brings us to the second possibility, Poss2, which holds that the permissibility of an 
option that entails another option is always less fundamental than the permissibility of the 
option that it entails. I call this view minimalism. Like maximalism, it holds that we must 
evaluate different sorts of options differently. But rather than distinguishing between 
maximal and non-maximal options (as maximalism does), it distinguishes between minimal 
and non-minimal options. An option φ is a minimal option if and only if there is no option ψ 
such that φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Otherwise, it’s a non-minimal option. Thus, 
typing the word ‘the’ won’t be a minimal option if typing is an option. And typing won’t be 
a minimal option if using a machine is an option. And using a machine won’t be a minimal 
option if doing something is an option. But doing something is a minimal option, for there is 
no option that it entails but not vice versa. Indeed, the only options that doing something 
entails are ones that are entailed by it—e.g., performing something. So, even though doing 
something entails performing something, doing something is still a minimal option given 
that performing something also entails doing something. Thus, minimal options will be 
options that are maximally general, such as the option of doing something and the option of 
performing something.  
When fully spelled out, minimalism says the following. 
 
Minimalism: (Min1) For any non-minimal option β, S’s β-ing is permissible if and 
only if there exists an option φ such that S’s φ-ing is permissible and S’s β-ing entails 
S’s φ-ing but not vice versa, and when S’s β-ing is permissible, this is in virtue of the 
fact that there exists an option φ such that S’s φ-ing is permissible and S’s β-ing 
entails S’s φ-ing but not vice versa. And, (Min2) for any minimal option α, S’s α-ing 
is permissible if and only if S’s α-ing has feature F, and when S’s α-ing is permissible, 
this is in virtue of the fact that S’s α-ing has feature F. 
 
  
According to minimalism, I’m permitted to perform an act so long as it entails 
performing a type of act that I’m permitted to perform. Thus, I’m permitted to make a bomb 
so long as I’m permitted to make something. And I’m permitted to feed my daughter 
poisoned food so long as I’m permitted to feed her some kind of food. I’m even permitted to 
commit mass genocide so long as I’m permitted to do something. For, on this view, I’m 
permitted to perform any of my non-minimal options so long as I’m permitted to perform 
some minimal option—that is, so long as I’m permitted to do something. After all, in each 
case, my performing that non-minimal option entails my doing something.  
This view is, I believe, false. Besides having the counterintuitive verdicts described 
above, it violates the following plausible principle. 
 
Coarseness Principle: The statement “S is permitted to φ” can be true even though 
there are many instances of S’s φ-ing that are impermissible. 
 
For instance, “I’m permitted to feed my daughter” is true even though there are many 
instances of feeding her that are impermissible: feeding her dirt, feeding her poisoned food, 
feeding her shards of glass, etc. But minimalism denies this. On minimalism, if I’m 
permitted to feed my daughter, because, say, I’m permitted to feed her a nutritious diet, 
then I’m permitted to perform anything that entails feeding my daughter, including feeding 
her shards of glass. Thus, I take minimalism to be a nonstarter. I considered it only to 
exhaust the logical possibilities.  
 
4. Omnism 
The next possibility, Poss3, holds that the permissibility of an option that entails another is 
never either more or less fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails. I 
call this view omnism, because ‘omnis’ means ‘all’ in Latin and this view holds that the 
permissibility of all options, whether they entail or are entailed by others, are equally 
fundamental. On this view, there is no need to distinguish between different types of 
options (such as, between minimal and non-minimal options or between maximal and non-
maximal options). For, on omnism, all options are to be evaluated in the same way. When 
fully spelled out, the view says the following. 
  
 
Omnism: For any option φ, S’s φ-ing is permissible if and only if S’s φ-ing has feature 
F, and when S’s φ-ing is permissible, this is in virtue of the fact that S’s φ-ing has 
feature F.  
 
Unlike maximalism and minimalism, omnism is an immensely popular view. 
Virtually all theories of morality and rationality that have been offered to date are versions 
of omnism.8 Substitute ‘maximizes utility’ for ‘has feature F’, and we get act-utilitarianism. 
Substitute ‘accords with Kant’s categorical imperative’ for ‘has feature F’, and we get 
Kantianism. And substitute ‘maximizes S’s utility’ for ‘has feature F’, and we get rational 
egoism. But despite its popularity, I believe that we should reject omnism. As I’ll show, 
several versions of omnism offer an implausible account of what makes maximal options 
permissible, and all others problematically generate conflicting obligations—instances in 
which a subject is both obligated to φ and obligated to refrain from ψ-ing even though it is 
logically impossible for her both to φ and to refrain from ψ-ing given that her φ-ing logically 
necessitates her ψ-ing.  
To see that some versions generate conflicting obligations, consider act-
utilitarianism’s implications in the following case. 
 
The Injection: Doc’s patient, Pat, needs an injection of drug D, and the sooner he gets 
it the better. Doc has the options of injecting him with a proper dose of D, injecting 
him with an improper dose of D, and not injecting him with D. The worst thing 
would be for Doc to inject him with an improper dose of D. That would kill Pat and 
result in Doc’s going to prison. It would be better not to inject him with D at all; in 
which case, Doc would lose her medical license but stay out of prison, while Pat 
would suffer for a few days before going to another doctor who would then inject 
him with a proper dose of D. It would be much better, though, if Doc were to inject 
Pat with a proper dose of D. Indeed, this would be best. For, in that case, everyone 
would live happily ever after. Now, as a matter of fact, if Doc were to inject Pat with 
                                                            
8 As far as I know, the only exceptions are the theories defended in Feldman 1986, Goldman 1978, Portmore 2011, and 
Zimmerman 1996, which are all versions of maximalism. 
  
D, she would inject Pat with an improper dose of D. This is not because of coercion 
or outside interference or anything like that, but because Doc is now forming the 
intention to kill Pat, who belongs to a race that she deeply despises.  
 
Act-utilitarianism implies that Doc is obligated to inject Pat with a proper dose of D, 
for this would produce more utility than any alternative would.9 But, interestingly, act-
utilitarianism also implies that Doc is obligated to refrain from injecting Pat with D, because 
injecting Pat with D would produce less utility than the alternative of refraining from 
injecting him with D would. It’s stipulated, after all, that if Doc were to inject Pat with D, she 
would inject Pat with an improper dose of D, which would result in Pat’s dying and Doc’s 
going to prison. And this would be much worse than the alternative of refraining from 
injecting him with D. Thus, act-utilitarianism implies both that Doc is obligated to inject Pat 
with a proper dose of D and that Doc is obligated to refrain from injecting him with D, and 
yet it is logically impossible for Doc both to inject him with a proper dose of D and to refrain 
from injecting him with D, for injecting him with a proper dose of D logically necessitates 
injecting him with D. And, so, we see that act-utilitarianism generates conflicting 
obligations.  
Such conflicting obligations are problematic, because the sorts of obligations at issue 
are meant to be action-guiding. That is, the sense of ‘obligation’ at issue is the one where, as 
a matter of conceptual necessity, believing that one has an obligation (in this sense) to φ 
rationally requires one to form the intention to φ. Thus, as I understand them, theories such 
as omnism, maximalism, and minimalism just are theories about obligations for which the 
following principle holds. 
 
Enkratic Principle: Rationality requires that a subject be such that, if she believes that 
she’s obligated to φ, she intends to φ (Broome 2013). 
 
                                                            
9 Act-utilitarianism holds that, for any option φ, S’s φ-ing is permissible if and only if there is no alternative option ψ such 
that S’s ψ-ing would produce more utility than S’s φ-ing would. This in conjunction with the claim that S’s φ-ing is obligatory 
if and only if φ-ing is S’s only permissible option entails that, on act-utilitarianism, an act is obligatory if it would produce 
more utility than any alternative would.  
  
Given that this is the sense of ‘obligation’ at issue, any version of omnism that 
generates conflicting obligations is committed to the denial of the plausible idea that 
rationality demands “that one’s intentions, taken together with one’s beliefs, fit together into 
a consistent model of one’s future” (Bratman 2009, p. 29). More specifically, we’ll have to 
deny the following. 
 
Belief-Intention Consistency Principle: Rationality requires that S be such that, if she 
believes that she will not both φ and ψ, then she does not both intend to φ and 
intend to ψ.10  
 
And here’s my argument for why we must deny conflicting obligations if we are to 
accept the above two principles.11 
 
(4.1) S is both obligated to φ and obligated to refrain from ψ-ing even though it is 
logically impossible for her both to φ and to refrain from ψ-ing. (Assumption 
for reductio) 
(4.2)  Rationality requires that S be such that, if she believes that she’s obligated to 
φ, she intends to φ. (The Enkratic Principle)  
(4.3)  Thus, rationality requires that, if S believes what’s true about what she’s 
obligated to do, she both intends to φ and intends to refrain from ψ-ing. 
(From 4.1 and 4.2) 
(4.4) If it is logically impossible for S both to φ and to refrain from ψ-ing, then she 
will not both φ and refrain from ψ-ing. (Analytic) 
(4.5) Thus, if S believes what’s true about what she will do, she believes that she 
will not both φ and refrain from ψ-ing. (From 4.1 and 4.4) 
(4.6) Thus, if S is as rationality requires and believes what’s true about what she 
will and is obligated to do, she both intends to φ and intends to refrain from 
                                                            
10 The variables φ and ψ range over both acts (e.g., x) and omissions (e.g., refrain from x-ing). This is the contrapositive of 
what Jacob Ross calls the Strong Belief Requirement—see his 2009, p. 246. And note that this is not the metaphysical view that 
intending to φ involves believing that one will φ. Rather, it is the normative view that intending to φ rationally requires one to 
believe that one will φ. For a defense, see Bratman 1984 and 1987.  
11 This argument comes from Kiesewetter 2015 (pp. 929–934). It is along similar lines to, though much better formulated 
than, the one that I gave in Portmore 2011 (pp. 181–183). It is, I believe, what I was grasping at then.  
  
ψ-ing and believes that she will not both φ and refrain from ψ-ing. (From 4.3 
and 4.5) 
(4.7) Rationality requires that S be such that, if she believes that she will not both φ 
and refrain from ψ-ing, then she does not both intend to φ and intend to 
refrain from ψ-ing. (From the Belief-Intention Consistency Principle)  
(4.8)  Thus, if S is as rationality requires and believes what’s true about what she 
will and is obligated to do, she will not be as rationality requires. (From 4.6 
and 4.7) 
(4.9) It is not the case that, if S is as rationality requires and believes what’s true 
about what she will and is obligated to do, she will not be as rationality 
requires. (Intuition)  
(4.10) Therefore, 4.1 is false; there are no conflicting obligations. (From 4.1, 4.8, and 
4.9) 
  
So, given that omnism is about obligations in the sense for which 4.2 is a conceptual 
necessity, the versions of omnism that generate conflicting obligations (e.g., act-
utilitarianism) must reject the Belief-Intention Consistency Principle. But we should not 
reject this plausible principle; we should instead reject any version of omnism that generates 
conflicting obligations.12 
It’s not just act-utilitarianism that generates conflicting obligations in The Injection. 
Any version of omnism that holds that an option is F if and only if it has the feature of being 
unsurpassed in terms of justice, fidelity, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, overall 
utility production, production of utility for the agent, etc. will generate conflicting 
obligations in this sort of case. And, to save words, I’ll hereafter call this feature ‘G’. Thus, 
my claim is that any version of omnism that holds that an option is F if and only if it is G 
will generate conflicting obligations. For such versions of omnism will entail both that (OB1) 
Doc is obligated to inject Pat with a proper dose of D and that (OB2) Doc is obligated to 
                                                            
12 Although what I’ve said rules out the possibility of conflicting moral obligations in the action-guiding sense of ‘moral 
obligation’ for which the Enkratic Principle applies, it does not rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas in which an agent 
will do something for which she will be morally blameworthy regardless of what she does, as where she has separately and 
negligently made two promises that she cannot both keep.  
  
refrain from injecting Pat with D. This is because, as I’ll now explain, injecting Pat with a 
proper dose of D is Doc’s only option that is G.  
Admittedly, given the above description of The Injection, it could be that Doc’s 
injecting Pat with a proper dose of D isn’t even G—let alone her only option that is G. For, as 
far as the above description goes, it could be that Doc has the option of killing Pat with an 
improper dose of D and then using his stem cells to synthesize a drug that would save 
thousands of people of Pat’s race. And if this were an option, injecting him with a proper 
dose of D would not be G, since injecting him with an improper dose of D and then using 
his stem cells to save thousands would produce more overall utility.13 But, for my purposes, 
I want a case in which Doc has no such option—that is, I want a case in which Doc has no 
better option than injecting Pat with a proper dose of D. So I hereby add to the above 
description the stipulation that there is no such option and that, therefore, Doc’s injecting 
Pat with a proper dose of D is G and, indeed, her only option that is G.  
Adding this stipulation ensures that any version of omnism that holds that an option 
is F if and only if it is G will entail both that (OB1) Doc is obligated to inject Pat with a 
proper dose of D and that (OB2) Doc is obligated to refrain from injecting Pat with D. It will 
entail OB1 given that Doc’s injecting Pat with a proper dose of D is her only option that is G 
and, thus, her only permissible option.14 Moreover, it will entail OB2, because injecting Pat 
with D is not G and, therefore, is not permissible. And if it’s impermissible for Doc to inject 
Pat with D, then she is obligated to refrain from injecting him with D.15 Thus, any version of 
omnism that holds that an option is F if and only if it is G will generate both OB1 and OB2 in 
The Injection. This includes not only consequentialist versions of omnism like act-
utilitarianism but also non-consequentialist versions of omnism like Rossian pluralism. So it 
seems that a great many versions of omnism will generate conflicting obligations. 
The only versions of omnism that won’t generate conflicting obligations are those 
that deny that an option is F if and only if it G. And there are only two ways that the omnist 
might do this. The first is to specify her F so that it implies that OB1 is false even though 
                                                            
13 Now, this may seem incompatible with the above stipulation that injecting Pat with an improper dose of D would 
produce less overall utility than injecting him with a proper dose of D. But it isn’t, for it could be that, given Doc’s hatred 
towards people of Pat’s race, she would not use Pat’s stem cells to save thousands of people of Pat’s race even if she were to kill 
him with an improper dose of D. 
14 I’m assuming that S is obligated to φ if and only if φ is S’s only permissible option. 
15 I’m assuming that S is prohibited from φ-ing if and only if S is obligated to refrain from φ-ing. 
  
Doc’s injecting Pat with a proper dose of D is her only option that is G. The second is to 
specify her F so that although OB1 is true, OB2 is false—false even though injecting Pat with 
D is not G. I’ll argue that both ways are problematic, starting with the first.  
To specify her F so that it implies that OB1 is false, the omnist must substitute for 
‘has feature F’ something that doesn’t correlate with G—something like ‘does not entail the 
commission of murder’. The result is what I’ll call no-murder omnism. On no-murder 
omnism, OB1 is false despite the fact that Doc’s injecting Pat with a proper dose of D is her 
only option that is G. It’s false, because Doc is permitted to refrain from injecting Pat with D 
given that so refraining doesn’t entail the commission of murder. The problem, though, is 
that it’s implausible to deny that Doc has an obligation to inject Pat with a proper dose of D. 
And that’s because Doc’s injecting him with a proper dose of D is her only option that is G 
and, thus, her best option. Indeed, it’s her best option by far. It’s certainly her best option in 
terms fidelity given that doing anything else would entail violating her Hippocratic Oath. 
It’s also her best option in terms of both overall utility and utility for herself, for it’s the only 
option that results in everyone’s living happily ever after. And it’s her best option in terms 
of respect for autonomy given that Pat has, we’ll assume, autonomously requested to receive 
a proper dose of D. Lastly, injecting him with a proper dose of D seems to be unsurpassed in 
terms of any other possibly relevant consideration. Thus, injecting Pat with a proper dose of 
D is Doc’s only option that is G and, thus, her best option. And it’s implausible to deny that 
Doc has an obligation to perform her best option in circumstances like these where there are 
multiple and significant factors at stake.16 And this means that the first way of avoiding 
conflicting obligations is implausible. For it involves specifying the omnist’s F so that it 
implausibly entails that OB1 is false.  
This brings us to the second way for omnism to avoid conflicting obligations in The 
Injection, and that is to specify its F such that OB1 is true but OB2 is false. To get the one 
obligation without the other, the omnist must specify her F such that some options (e.g., 
injecting Pat with a proper dose of D) are F if and only if they are G but that other options 
(e.g., injecting Pat with D) are F even though they are not G. And to do that she must jury-
                                                            
16 I would allow that there could be cases in which there is no obligation to φ even though φ is the only option that is G, but 
these would all have to be cases in which φ is the only option that is G because φ is just slightly better in terms of utility. But, in 
The Injection, injecting Pat with a proper dose of D is significantly better in terms of utility. Moreover, it is better in terms of 
more than just utility—it is, for instance, also better in terms of fidelity and respect for autonomy.   
  
rig F. That is, she must substitute something like ‘is entailed by a maximal option that is G*’ 
for ‘has feature F’ in the above formulation of omnism, where G* is any feature that 
necessarily correlates with G. I’ll call the resulting theory maximalist omnism, because it is 
extensionally equivalent to the version of maximalism that substitutes ‘has feature G*’ for 
‘has feature F’ in the above formulation of maximalism. Now, on maximalist omnism, Doc’s 
injecting Pat with a proper dose of D is obligatory, because it is entailed by all maximal 
options that are G*. After all, the only maximal options that are G* are those in which Doc 
injects Pat with a proper dose of D. And, naturally, all these entail Doc’s injecting Pat with a 
proper dose of D. Thus, maximalist omnism, unlike no-murder omnism, plausibly endorses 
OB1. But it denies OB2, thereby avoiding conflicting obligations. For, on maximalist 
omnism, Doc is permitted to inject Pat with D. What’s more, Doc is obligated to inject Pat 
with D. For, again, all the maximal options that are G* entail injecting Pat with a proper dose 
of D and, thus, also entail injecting him with D. Thus, even though injecting Pat with D is 
not G it is, on maximalist omnism, obligatory. And so maximalist omnism entails OB1 but 
not OB2.  
The problem with this way of avoiding conflicting obligations, though, is that it 
commits the omnist to rejecting the most straightforward and plausible explanation for why 
Doc is permitted to perform a maximal option that is G*. Rather than simply claiming that 
performing such a maximal option is permissible because it is G*, the omnist must claim 
something like one of the following: (E1) it is permissible because it is entailed by a maximal 
option that is G*; (E2) it is permissible because it is entailed by a maximal option that is 
entailed by a maximal option that is G*; (E3) it is part of the ideal future in which she 
performs only maximal options that are G*; (E4) it is part of the ideal future in which all 
agents perform only maximal options that are G*; etc.  
To illustrate the problem, suppose that ‘has feature G*’ stands for something like ‘is 
in accordance with Kant’s categorical imperative’ or ‘is a what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do in the circumstances’—assuming, of course, that these necessarily 
correlate with G, and insofar as they are plausible it seems that they must. Now, the omnist 
who is adopting this approach to avoiding conflicting obligations cannot simply substitute 
‘has feature G*’ for ‘has feature F’ in the formulation of omnism, for, given that G* 
necessarily correlates with G, this would commit her to both OB1 and OB2. Instead, she 
  
must specify her F so that maximal options will be permissible if and only if they are G*, but 
that non-maximal options will be permissible provided that they are entailed by a maximal 
option that is G* and, thus, regardless of whether they are themselves G*. Thus, she has to 
jury-rig her F so that the resulting verdicts are extensionally equivalent to the version of 
maximalism that substitutes G* for maximalism’s F. But although this allows the omnist to 
get the same verdicts, it commits her to a different account of what makes maximal options 
permissible. Whereas the maximalist will hold that a permissible maximal option is 
permissible in virtue of its having feature G*, the omnist must hold that a permissible 
maximal option is permissible in virtue of something like its being entailed by a maximal 
option that is G*. The problem, then, is that this seems like an implausible explanation for 
why it’s permissible to perform a maximal option that is G*. Whether a maximal option is G* 
seems relevant. But whether a maximal option is entailed by a maximal option that is G* 
doesn’t. Indeed, it seems no more relevant than does whether a maximal option is entailed 
by a maximal option that is entailed by a maximal option that is G*. Likewise, whether a 
maximal option is part of the ideal future in which the agent performs only maximal options 
that are G* seems no more relevant than whether it is part of the ideal future in which all 
agents perform only maximal options that are G*. Thus, the second way of avoiding 
conflicting obligations forces the omnist to adopt an implausible view about what makes 
maximal options that are G* permissible.  
So I’ve argue that, in order to avoid conflicting obligations, the omnist must either (1) 
specify her F so that it implies that OB1 is false or (2) specify her F so that although OB1 is 
true, OB2 is false. And I’ve argued that both are implausible. The first is implausible because 
it’s implausible to deny OB1, and the second is implausible because it’s implausible to deny 
that what makes a maximal option that is G* permissible is that it is G*. Thus, we should, I 
believe, reject omnism. 
 
5. Hybridism 
This brings us to the last of the four possibilities: Poss4. On this view, there is a lack 
uniformity, as there would be, for instance, if sometimes the permissibility of an option that 
entails another is more fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails, but 
other times the permissibility of an option that entails another is less fundamental than the 
  
permissibility of the option that it entails. For obvious reasons, I’ll call this view hybridism. 
Now, there are many different possible versions of hybridism, but I’ll consider just one. For 
it seems rather straightforward how the problems for it—problems involving both 
arbitrariness and inheriting the vices of at least one of its two parents—easily generalize to 
other possible versions of hybridism. The version of hybridism that I’ll consider is the one 
that seems most natural. It holds that whether we take the permissibility of a given option to 
be a function of the options that it entails, a function of the options that entail it, or a 
function of neither depends on the given option’s level of entailment, where an option’s 
level of entailment is a function of both which other options it entails and which other 
options entail it, such that maximal options (which entail all other options but are entailed 
by no other option) have the highest level of entailment and minimal options (which entail 
no other option but are entailed by every other option) have the lowest level of entailment. 
When fully spelled out, the view is as follows. 
 
Hybridism: (Hyb1) For any option z whose level of entailment is 𝓔, S’s z-ing is 
permissible if and only if S’s z-ing has feature F, and when S’s z-ing is permissible, 
this is in virtue of the fact that S’s z-ing has feature F. (Hyb2) For any option x whose 
level of entailment is greater than 𝓔, S’s x-ing is permissible if and only if there is an 
option z such that (a) it is F, (b) S’s x-ing entails S’s z-ing, and (c) its level of 
entailment is 𝓔, and when S’s x-ing is permissible, this is in virtue of the fact that 
there is such a z. And (Hyb3) for any option y whose level of entailment is less than 𝓔, S’s y-ing is permissible if and only if there is an option z such that (a) it is F, (b) S’s 
z-ing entails S’s y-ing, and (c) its level of entailment is 𝓔, and when S’s y-ing is 
permissible, this is in virtue of the fact that there is such a z.  
 
Hybridism seems to be the least promising of the four possibilities. For one, it seems 
that unless we set 𝓔 at one of the two extremes (that is, at either the maximal or minimal 
level of entailment), it will be arbitrary, as there will be no justification for setting it	at that 
point and not at some point slightly higher or lower than it. And if we do set 𝓔	at one of the 
two extremes, it will cease to be distinct, for it will collapse into either maximalism or 
minimalism. If, on the one hand, we set 𝓔 at the maximal level of entailment, which is the 
  
level that only maximal options reach, then there will be no option x whose level of 
entailment is greater than 𝓔. And, in that case, Hyb2 drops out, and hybridism collapses into 
maximalism. If, on the one hand, we set 𝓔 at the minimal level of entailment, which is the 
level that all but minimal options exceed, then there will be no option y whose level of 
entailment is less than 𝓔. And, in that case, Hyb3 drops out, and hybridism collapses into 
minimalism. So either hybridism is going to be arbitrary or it’s going collapse into either 
maximalism or minimalism. 
And this is not hybridism only problem. In holding Hyb2, hybridism becomes 
sufficiently like minimalism to be subject to the same sorts of counterexamples that it’s 
subject to. To illustrate, let’s again consider The Injection. And let’s suppose that the level of 
entailment of Doc’s injecting Pat with the proper dose of D is precisely at 𝓔. In setting 𝓔 at 
this point, the hybridist can avoid implying both that (OB1) Doc is obligated to inject Pat 
with the proper dose of D and that (OB2) Doc is obligated to refrain from injecting Pat with 
D. Since injecting Pat with D is at a lower level of entailment than injecting Pat with the 
proper dose of D, we do not assess it in terms of F. Instead, we assess it in terms of whether 
it is entailed by a permissible option that is at level 𝓔. And, indeed, it is entailed by injecting 
Pat with the proper dose of D, which is an option at level 𝓔. Thus, hybridism implies that 
Doc is obligated to inject Pat with D. So there’s no conflict of obligations here. But, given that 
hybridism accepts Hyb2, we have to hold that any option y that’s at a greater level of 
entailment than 𝓔 (such as, the option of injecting Pat with the proper dose of D and then 
slitting his throat afterwards) is permissible if there is an option z such that (a) it is F, (b) it is 
at level 𝓔, and (c) it is entailed by the performance of y. And there is such an option z—
namely, the option of injecting Pat with the proper dose of D. Thus, like minimalism, 
hybridism implies such absurd things as that Doc is permitted to inject Pat with the proper 
dose of D and then slit his throat afterwards. Given this, hybridism seems as much of a non-
starter as minimalism.  
These problems will generalize to any version of hybridism. Even if we use 
something besides the level entailment to determine which options are to be assessed in 
terms of F, which options are to be assessed in terms of options that entail it, and which 
options are to be assessed in terms of options it entails, we’re going to run into these 
  
problems of being arbitrary and/or inheriting minimalism’s counterintuitive implications. So 
I believe we should reject hybridism.   
 
6. Maximalism’s Explanatory Component 
Maximalism (i.e., Poss1) seems to be the clear winner, for it seems to be the only possibility 
without unsurmountable difficulties. Some, however, may worry that I’ve overlooked an 
important difficulty with maximalism. Specifically, some may worry that maximalism gives 
the wrong explanation for why permissible non-maximal options are permissible. According 
to maximalism, if a subject is permitted to perform a non-maximal option 𝜈, this is in virtue 
of the fact that her 𝜈-ing is entailed by a maximal option that has the right-making feature F. 
But it may seem that the explanation for why she is permitted to 𝜈 lies simply with the fact 
that her 𝜈-ing is itself F and not with the fact that it is entailed by a maximal option that is F. 
To illustrate, suppose that I’m getting ready for bed and that, under the circumstances, it is 
permissible for me to brush my teeth as part of my preparations. Now, the explanation for 
this being permissible may seem to lie simply with the fact that my doing so would itself 
have optimal consequences (by preventing tooth decay) and not with the fact that it is 
entailed by a maximal option that would have optimal consequences. So it may seem that, 
contrary to maximalism, maximal options have nothing to do with the explanation for why 
I’m permitted to brush my teeth. But, surely, if I’m permitted to brush my teeth, it must be 
in virtue of my being permitted to perform some specific instance of teeth-brushing. After 
all, if my circumstances were different such that the only brush available to me was a wire-
bristled one, I wouldn’t be permitted to brush my teeth. For brushing my teeth with such a 
brush would cause more damage to my teeth than not brushing at all.  
Also, if my circumstances were such that there was no permissible way for me to 
follow up with brushing my teeth, I wouldn’t be permitted to brush my teeth. Suppose, for 
instance, that there was an evil demon who would kill me and my family if I were brush my 
teeth without following up by drinking a glass orange juice immediately afterwards. In that 
case, I would not be permitted to brush my teeth. For it would be bad to brush my teeth and 
then drink a glass of orange juice immediately afterwards. The combination of brushing and 
then immediately drinking something acidic would cause more damage to my teeth’s 
enamel than not brushing at all. And I certainly wouldn’t be permitted to brush my teeth 
  
and not follow up by drinking the orange juice immediately afterwards given that that 
would result in the evil demon’s killing me and my family. So it seems that if I’m permitted 
to brush my teeth, it must be because I’m permitted to perform some option that entails my 
brushing my teeth (e.g., the option of brushing my teeth with a toothbrush in the dentist-
recommended fashion and then following up by going straight to bed without eating or 
drinking anything). And, in turn, if I’m permitted to perform this option, it must be because 
I’m permitted to perform some option that entails performing this option. And so and so 
forth, until we reach a maximal option that is F. So, on reflection, we should think that the 
explanation for why I’m permitted to brush my teeth has everything to do with its being 
entailed by a maximal option that is F.  
To further illustrate the plausibility of maximalism’s explanatory component, 
consider the following case.  
 
Two Drugs: Dr. Singh is deliberating at t0 about what drugs, if any, to give his patient, 
Prisha, at t2. In fact, there are exactly two drugs available to him: A and B. If he gives 
Prisha both A and B at t2, using his right hand to inject her with A and his left hand 
to inject her with B, she’ll be cured of her painful, but non-fatal, medical condition. If 
he gives her just one of A and B at t2, she’ll die immediately. And if he gives him 
neither A nor B at t2, she’ll be rendered incurable, having, then, to live the rest of her 
life with this painful medical condition. And although this would be quite bad, it 
would not be as bad as her dying immediately. Now, as a matter fact, Dr. Singh is 
going to form at t1 the intention to kill her by giving him just one of A and B at t2. 
Moreover, he’s going to follow through with this intention. For, as it turns out, he is 
Prisha’s jilted lover. Given that he’s going to form, and then follow through, with the 
intention to give her just one of A and B at t2, the following two subjunctive 
conditionals are true: (SC1) if he were to give her A at t2, he would not give her B at t2 
and (SC2) if he were to give her B at t2, he would not give her A at t2. Nevertheless, if 
he were to respond appropriately to the decisive reason he has for curing her and 
thereby come instead to form at t1 the intention to cure her by giving her both A and 
B at t2, he would follow through with this intention and Prisha would live happily 
  
ever after. Lastly, assume that Dr. Singh will lose his medical license if he fails to cure 
her and will go to prison if he kills her. 
 
It seems that Dr. Singh is both permitted to give Prisha A at t2 and permitted to give 
her B at t2. But the explanation for why this is so has nothing to do with facts about each of 
these acts. For instance, it’s not that performing each of these act would have good 
consequences. In fact, given the truth of SC1, injecting her with A at t2 would have terrible 
consequences. And, given the truth of SC2, injecting her with B at t2 would also have terrible 
consequences. Instead, the explanation for why Dr. Singh is both permitted to give her A at 
t2 and permitted to give her B at t2 is that he’s permitted to do something that entails doing 
each of these. That is, he is permitted to give Prisha both A and B at t2, and this logically 
necessitates both giving her A at t2 and giving her B at t2. Taking this further, it would seem 
that the explanation for why she is permitted give Prisha both A and B at t2 is that he is 
permitted to perform some option that entails doing this, such as injecting her with these 
drugs using sterile needles. And so and so forth, until we reach some maximal option that is 
F.  
So although it may seem strange at first to think that the explanation for its being 
permissible to perform some non-maximal option lies with the fact that it is entailed by the 
performance of a maximal option that is F, these cases illustrate that, on reflection, this is 
indeed what we should think. We should think, for instance, that it is permissible for Dr. 
Singh to inject Prisha with A, not because doing so would itself have optimal consequences 




I’ve argued that we should accept maximalism. It encapsulates the intuitive idea that, if I’m 
permitted to perform a certain type of action, this is because there is some instance of this 
type that I’m permitted to perform. Moreover, as I’ve showed, none of the objections that 
have been offered against maximalism are persuasive. And, in this respect, maximalism is 
superior to its three alternatives (viz., omnism, hybridism, and minimalism). All of which 
have serious problems.  
  
 If maximalism is true, then nearly all the theories of morality and rationality that 
have so far been proffered are false, for nearly all of them are versions of omnism. They are 
versions of omnism in that they don’t even distinguish between maximal and non-maximal 
options. And in failing to distinguish between these two types of options, they presume that 
we can assess the deontic statuses of non-maximal options without appealing to the deontic 
statuses of the maximal options that entail them. That is, they assume that we can evaluate 
both maximal and non-maximal options in terms of whether or not they have some right-
making feature F. As a consequence, they will either generate conflicting obligations or offer 
an implausible explanation for what makes permissible maximal option permissible.  
Of course, having to reject all the many versions of omnism that have been offered to 
date doesn’t mean that all is lost. We just need to reformulate these theories. These theories 
identify some right-making feature of actions, and, for all that I’ve said, they may have 
correctly done so. They just make the mistake in thinking that we are to assess all options in 
terms of this feature when we must assess only maximal options in terms of this feature. The 
lesson, then, is that Kantians, utilitarians, Rossian pluralists, and others need to revise their 
theories on the model of maximalism, inserting what they take to be the relevant right-making 
feature for F in that formulation.17  
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